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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3702 
JAMES G. SWEENEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, ESQS. (PAULINE F. ROGERS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
The charge herein was filed by the County Employees Unit, 
Orange County Chapter 836, Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc. (CSEA) on November 24, 1978. It alleges that the County of 
Orange (County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing 
to negotiate in good faith in that it unilaterally instituted a 
procedure whereby all unit members would be paid after a uniform 
lag of one week following the performance of their work. Pre-
viously many employees had been paid for all work performed up to 
the date of payment. Others had been paid after a lag of one week 
while still others were paid after a two-week lag. Provision for 
payment after the work is performed is known as a "lag payroll". 
The County acknowledges that it had altered its prior pay-
roll practice but it asserted that it was required to do so by 
§369.4 of the County Law, which provides that a payroll must be 
certified "as to its correctness" before employees may be paid. 
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In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF ORANGE, 
Respondent, 
-and-
COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNIT, ORANGE COUNTY 
CHAPTER 836, THE.CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
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It argues that some lag is necessary to permit the certification 
of the payroll. The County concedes, however, that its asserted 
right to impose a lag payroll does not relieve it of a duty to 
negotiate the extent of that lag and other details relating to 
what it recognizes as the "implementation',' of its decision to in-
stitute a lag. However, it contends that it had satisfied its 
duty to negotiate such "implementation','. It also contends that 
CSEA waived any further right to negotiate regarding the lag 
payroll. In support of its waiver contention, the County relies 
upon a management rights clause in its collective agreement with 
' 1 
CSEA and upon two demands, Nos. 2 and 15, made and withdrawn by 
1 The management rights clause provides: 
"Section 1. All management functions, rights, powers 
and authority whether heretofore or hereafter 
exercised shall remain vested exclusively in the 
County. It is expressly recognized that these 
functions include, but are not limited.,to: 
1. Full and exclusive control of the management 
and operation of the County; 
3. Scheduling of work; 
4. The right to introduce new or improved methods 
or facilities; 
8. The right to formulate any reasonable rules and 
regulations. 
Section 2. All the functions, rights, powers and 
authority which the Employer has not specifically 
abridged, terminated or modified by this Agreement 
are recognized by the Union as being retained by 
the Employer." 
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2 
CSEA that allegedly dealt with the lag payroll. 
In its post-hearing brief, the County attributed to CSEA 
reliance upon §4 of Article 3 of the recently negotiated agreement 
3 
which provides for the maintenance of past practices. The hearing 
officer determined that the subject matter of the charge was 
covered by §4 of Article 3 of the recently negotiated contract and 
she ruled that the Board may not interpret that provision. Accord 
ingly, she dismissed the charge. 
The matter is before us on the exceptions of CSEA. It 
argues that the hearing officer erred in relying upon the mainten-
ance of past practices clause without affording the parties an 
2 Respectively, these demands provided: 
"
2
- ARTICLE 5 - Section 1-D - All employees 
shall receive at least two weeks notice before 
a shift change can be made. 
The employer shall establish a standard pay 
period for all employees. 
No shift or work week shall be changed to avoid 
paying overtime. 
1 5
 • ARTICLE 31 - Add New Section - All employees 
who have had a weeks pay withheld shall have the 
weeks pay restored after serving 4 years." 
3_ It states: 
"Maintenance of Past Practices: The Employer agrees 
that all conditions of employment not otherwise pro-
vided for herein relating to wages, hours of work and 
general working conditions shall be maintained at the 
standards in effect at the time of the signing of the 
Agreement except as specifically modified or abridged 
by this Agreement." 
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opportunity to submit evidence regarding the relevance of that 
clause to the lag payroll dispute. Had it been given that oppor-
tunity, CSEA asserts, it could have proved by affirmative evidence 
- what should have been clear to the hearing officer from the 
absence of any-.contrary, evidence - that .the clause was irrelevant. 
Finally, CSEA argues, that the record evidence establishes the 
County's violation of its duty to negotiate regarding the lag pay-
roll. 
At oral argument, the County responded by reasserting its 
previous arguments that the County Law obliged it to institute a 
lag payroll for all employees and that it had satisfied its duty 
to negotiate the implementation of its decision to institute a 
lag payroll. . 
DISCUSSION' 
We reverse the determination of the hearing officer that 
the maintenance of past practices clause is dispositive of the 
issue. The clause does not, on its face, deal with the issue of a 
lag payroll and neither party had interpreted it as doing so.- In 
its post-hearing brief, however, the County asserted that CSEA 
relied upon the clause as the basis for its charge. CSEA denied 
that it placed.any reliance upon it, and the record supports the 
CSEA denial. We therefore regard this County assertion as no more 
than an afterthought unsupported by the record. 
Having determined that the evidence does not support the 
hearing officer's conclusion that the parties dealt with the issue 
of a lag payroll in their agreement, we now address the question 
whether the County violated its duty to negotiate in good faith . 
when it unilaterally instituted a uniform one-week-lag payroll. 
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We conclude that it did. Assuming arguendo that County Law. 
§369.4 requires the County to impose some payroll lag in order to 
facilitate the certification of the correctness of the payroll, 
the County nevertheless was obligated, as it concedes, to negoti-
ate aspects of the lag. We are not persuaded by its arguments 
that it has satisfied that obligation or that CSEA has waived its 
right to negotiate the subject. 
Assuming that the authority to institute a lag payroll is 
in the management rights clause to which CSEA agreed, nothing in 
that clause suggests that the County is authorized to determine 
unilaterally the length of the lag period.' The County's reliance 
upon CSEA's withdrawal of its demands Nos.[ 2 and 15 is, as the 
evidence shows, also misplaced. Demand No.' 2 plainly deals with 
the stabilization of shifts and the protection of opportunities 
for overtime pay. The evidence shows- that language of the demand 
for a standard pay period was designed to eliminate confusion as 
to what the pay period in all departments of the County was. Some 
employees believed that they were paid on a bi-weekly work schedule 
running from Saturday of one week to Friday of the following week, 
while others believed that they were paid on a weekly work sched-
ule running from Monday.to Sunday. It does not deal with how soon 
,employees are paid after their work.is performed. Demand No. 15, 
clearly unrelated to any kind of payroll system, was concerned 
with the payment to some employees of wages retained by the County 
under some sort of escrow arrangement. Consequently, CSEA's with-
drawal of these unrelated demands did not constitute a waiver of 
its right to negotiate as to a uniform one-week-lag payroll. 
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The record established that the County had wished to 
institute a lag payroll for some time prior to negotiations and 
that it had conducted a county-wide lag-time survey during the 
course of negotiations. However, it made no specific negotiation 
proposal regarding any kind of lag payroll; nor did it give CSEA 
any other notice during negotitiations of the kind of change it 
was contemplating. The County asserts that its duty to negotiate 
was satisfied because it informed CSEA that it was contemplating 
a uniform lag payroll. It argues that, having done so, it trans-
ferred the burden to CSEA to come forth with a specific proposal 
regarding a lag payroll and that CSEA's failure to make such a 
proposal constituted a waiver. We do not agree. In Press Co., 
Inc., 121 NLRB 976 (1958), the National Labor Relations Board held 
that the mere discussion of a subject during negotiations, not 
specifically covered in the resulting contract, does not remove 
that subject from the realm of collective bargaining during the 
contract term. The Board points out that a contrary holding would 
permit an employer to avoid its duty to negotiate certain matters 
by raising them in casual discussions during negotiations and 
explained that the union would be required to press the negotia-
tion of any subject thus raised or be deemed to have waived its 
right to negotiate the subject later during the term of the agree-
ment. This process would impose a needless impediment in the way 
of successful collective bargaining. We accept the reasoning of 
the NLRB. Consequently, in view of the fact that the County in-
formed CSEA in only vague terms that it was contemplating a uniform 
lag payroll, CSEA was* under no duty to. make a proposal regarding a 
lag payroll and its failure to do so did not constitute a waiver of 
its right to negotiate the matter during the life of the contract 
3oard - U-3702 -7 
NOW., THEREFORE, WE REVERSE the decision of the hearing 
officer; and 
WE DETERMINE that the County of Orange 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law by refusing 
to negotiate in good faith in that it unilaterally 
instituted a lag payroll of one week; and 
WE ORDER the County of Orange: 
1. To reinstate the procedures regarding the time 
of payment of wages, in relation to time worked for 
those wages, that existed prior to the unilateral 
change; and 
2. To negotiate with CSEA as to changes in the time 
of payment of wages in relation to time worked. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
November 30, 1979 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
C#^U /^&Ut42^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COHOES CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
COHOES TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL #2579 
Charging Party. 
JOSEPH A. IGOE, for Respondent 
JOHN R. SOLE, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Cohoes 
City School District (District) to a decision of a hearing officer 
that it violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the 
Cohoes Teachers Association, Local #2579 (CTA), in that it failed 
to maintain the status quo regarding the early dismissal of stu-
dents on days when faculty meetings or CTA meetings would be held. 
BACKGROUND 
The District and CTA commenced negotiations on March 21, 
1978, for a contract to succeed one that would expire on June 30, 
1978. Among the proposals made by the District was a change in 
Article III (H) of the existing agreement which provided: 
1 A second charge by CTA was dismissed by the hearing officer. It 
alleged that the District had altered the status quo by uni-
laterally increasing the workday and the work year of teachers 
by conduct unrelated to the issues now before us. The hearing 
officer determined that the evidence did not support the 
allegation. CTA has filed no exceptions to the determination 
of the hearing officer. 
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"Thursday shall be held open for faculty and CTA 
meetings with prior notification of such meeting 
having been given on the preceding Monday. In 
case of an emergency, a meeting may be called by 
the building principal or President of CTA. On 
meeting days, pupils will be dismissed 30 minutes 
earlier than usual dismissal." (emphasis supplied) 
The proposal of the District was to delete the underscored languag 
and to substitute for it "pupils will be dismissed at the regular 
time." 
The alleged reason for the proposed change was a directive 
of the State Department of Education to the District in February, 
1976 that it would have to change its early dismissal practice in 
order to come into, compliance with the State Commissioner of 
Education. The Department of Education indicated that these 
changes should await the expiration of the agreement between the 
District and CTA, but that the provisions of any subsequent con-
tract should be consistent with the regulations of the Education 
Commissioner. 
Negotiations for an agreement to succeed the one expiring 
on June 30, 1978, continued for a period of months. The parties 
were still in active negotiations on the issue of the extra 
thirty minutes as well as other issues when school opened in 
September, 1978. By that time, they had been through mediation 
and factfinding procedures of the Taylor Law, and both parties 
had rejected the recommendations of a factfinder. These negotia-
tions were still in progress when the hearing officer issued her 
decision on May 4, 1979. 
Having failed to reach an agreement with CTA by the open-
ing of school in September, 1978, the District unilaterally 
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abandoned its prior practice under^  the expired agreement of dis-
missing students thirty minutes early on days when faculty or CTA 
meetings were scheduled, and it required its teachers to work the 
thirty minutes. These actions precipitated the charge. 
The hearing officer determined that the District did not 
have to change the student dismissal time and extend the teaching 
time in the elementary and high schools in order to satisfy the 
requirements of the Education Commissioner. Accordingly, she found 
that the increase of the student instructional and faculty teach-
ing time in the elementary and high schools violated the District's 
duty to negotiate in good faith. On the other hand, she deter-
mined that an increase in the instructional time of students in 
the middle school was required for compliance with the regulations 
of the Education Commissioner. Accordingly, she ruled that there 
was a compelling need for the District to increase the student 
instructional and the consequent faculty teaching time in the 
middle school and that the unilateral change there did not violate 
the Taylor Law. 
In its exceptions, the District argues, among other things, 
that the hearing officer did not properly interpret the ruling of 
the Education Department. It contends that a proper interpreta-
tion is that the ruling would be that additional instructional 
time is required in the elementary schools as well as in the mid-
dle school. 
DISCUSSION 
We believe that the emphasis given to the regulation of 
the Education Commissioner by both the hearing officer and the 
District was misplaced. The number of hours of student 
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instruction is a permissive, but not a mandatory, siubject of nego-
tiation. New York City School Boards. Assn., Inc. v. Board of 
Education, 39 NY2d 111 (1976). This is so even where a school 
district chooses to offer a number of hours of educational instruc 
tion that exceeds that required by the Education Commissioner. 
Thus, with respect to student, attendance time, the unilateral 
change by the District of the practice recited in Article III (H) 
of the prior agreement did not violate its duty to negotiate in 
good faith, because it had no Taylor Law duty to maintain that 
practice. Board' of Education of the City of New York, 5 PERB 
If3054 (1972). The action of the District, however, in restoring 
the regular dismissal time resulted not merely in an increase in 
the instructional time of students; it also resulted in an 
increase in the working time of teachers-. Such an increase is • 
a term and condition of employment and ordinarily an employer may 
not change a term and condition of employment unilaterally. In 
Wappingers -Central School District, 5 PERB 1(3074 (1972), however, 
we recognized an -exception to this general rule. There we held 
that an employer may unilaterally change a term and condition 
of employment where: (1) there are compelling reasons for the 
employer to act unilaterally at the time it does so; and (2) 
it had negotiated the change in good faith by negotiating with 
the employee organization to the point of impasse before making 
the change and by continuing thereafter to negotiate the issue. 
These circumstances are all present in the instant case. 
It is clear that the District, having properly added thirty 
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minutes to the instructional time of students, was under a com-
pelling need to provide teacher supervision and instruction for 
the students during that time. The record supports the finding o 
the hearing officer that the District negotiated with CTA as to 
faculty teaching time to the point of impasse before making the 
change and continued thereafter to negotiate the issue with CTA. 
Accordingly, we determine that the District did not vio-
late its duty to negotiate in good faith by reason of the conduct 
complained of herein, and 
WE ORDER that the charge, herein be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
DATED: Albany, New York 
November 30, 1979 
V^^Ze^^C^i^^ 
R. Newman, Chairman 
3s*. 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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In the Matter of 
TOWN OF SHELTER ISLAND, 
Respondent, 
-and-
SHELTER ISLAND POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHELTER ISLAND POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
TOWN OF SHELTER ISLAND, 
Charging Party. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-3538 
CASE NO. U-3569 
GEORGE C. STANKEVICH, ESQ. for the Town 
HARTMAN & LERNER, ESQS. for PBA 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of 
Shelter Island (Town) to a decision of a hearing officer dismissing 
its charge (U-3569) that the Shelter Island Police Benevolent Asso 
1 
ciation (PBA) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. The Town had 
alleged that PBA had refused to negotiate in good faith in that (1) 
it had included several nonmandatory or prohibited subjects of 
[negotiation in its demands $. (2) it had refused to negotiate ground 
fl In a consolidated decision, the hearing officer also dismissed a 
charge by the PBA (U-3538) that the Town violated its duty to 
negotiate in good faith. We do not reach any of the issues 
involved in that part of the hearing officer's decision because 
PBA has filed no exceptions to it. 
6049 
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rules regarding the presence of observers during negotiations and 
the transcription of negotiations; and (3) it had failed to attend 
one negotiating session and walked out of a second negotiating 
session. 
THE HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION 
In dismissing the first specification of the .Town's charge 
the hearing officer ruled that the allegation that PBA had made 
proposals for nonmandatory and prohibited subjects of negotiation 
was "premature". He noted that the parties had not yet begun to ne^  
gotiate and that the record did not indicate that the Town had even 
made a request that PBA withdraw any of its demands. In dismissing 
the second specification of the charge, the hearing officer ruled 
that PBA was not obligated to negotiate these ground rules because 
they are not terms or conditions of employment. Finally, the 
hearing officer dismissed the third specification of the charge on 
the ground that PBA's failure to appear at one negotiating session 
and its walking out of a second did not evidence "bad faith". The 
session at which it did not appear had been cancelled the previous 
day by the PBA attorney, who had informed the Town at that time of 
a conflicting court engagement. PBA walked out of another nego-
tiating session because the Town had invited representatives of 
the press to attend negotiations as observers and, over the 
objections of the PBA, the Town addressed comments to the observers 
that disparaged the proposals of the PBA. The hearing officer 
ruled that this conduct constituted sufficient provocation 
excusing the PBA's action in walking out of the session. 
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THE TOWN'S EXCEPTIONS 
The Town asserts that the hearing officer erred in that 
he failed to find an improper practice when, subsequent to the 
filing of the charge, PBA carried allegedly nonmandatory and pro-
hibited subjects of negotiation into impasse. It also contends 
that PBA was obligated to negotiate concerning the ground rules 
that it sought. Finally, it asserts that the presence of observers 
could not have justified PBA's walking out because the observers 
bad a statutory right to be present under the New York Open 
Meetings Law (Public Officers Law §96, et seq.). 
In addition to the exceptions addressed to the substantive 
determinations of the hearing officer, the Town also protested 
several procedural rulings made by the hearing officer under these 
circumstances: The Town had invited newspaper and television re-
porters to cover the PERB hearing on the instant charges. PBA 
Dbjected to the taping of the hearing for television. After con-
sulting with the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director), the hearing officer ruled that the 
proceedings could not be taped. The Town now protests both the 
ruling of the hearing officer and the fact that he consulted with 
the Director. It also protests rulings of the hearing officer ex-
cluding expert and lay testimony proferred by the Town to show the 
desirability of having observers at negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm both the procedural rulings and substantive 
determinations of the hearing officer. The hearing officer com-
mitted no" error by consulting with the Director with respect to 
television coverage of the proceeding before him. This is a matter 
6051 
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for the hearing officer's discretion. Nor was it error for him to 
preclude the taping of the hearing. A party does not have a right 
2 
to have a quasi-judicial proceeding taped for television. 
The expert witnesses whose testimony the Town sought to 
introduce were prepared to testify that the presence of observers 
at negotiations enhances the process. This testimony was properly 
excluded by the hearing officer. The issue before him as raised 
by the Town was one of law and not of policy. That testimony was 
irrelevant to the question whether the Town could insist upon the 
presence of observers or even insist upon negotiations concerning 
their presence. Even as to policy, however, established principles 
of this Board on this issue render such evidence unnecessary. 
Similarly, the hearing officer properly sustained objections to 
the testimony of lay witnesses when they were asked whether they 
favored the presence of reporters at negotiations or whether they 
believed that the Open Meetings Law does, or ought to, cover col-
lective negotiations. 
We affirm the determination of the hearing officer that a 
party to negotiations may not insist upon the presence of observers 
during negotiations or upon the transcription of the negotiation 
proceedings; nor may it insist upon the negotiation of ground 
2 We note that the question whether judicial and quasi-judicial 
proceedings should be televised is being given serious con-
sideration in many states. BERGAN, FRANCIS, "Lawyer, Judge, 
Camera!", New York State Bar Journal, October 1979, Vol. 51, 
No. 6, pp. 458, 459" 
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rules providing for them. The Town's reliance upon the Open 
Meetings Law is misplaced. That law defines a covered meeting as 
"the formal convening of a public body for the purpose of officially 
transacting public business." (Public Officers Law §97.1). Collec 
tive negotiation sessions betweenu.a public body and an employee 
organization are by their nature not meetings within the contempla-
tion of that law. Indeed, even when a government holds a meeting 
by itself that deals with collective negotiations, it may do so in 
executive session. (Public Officers Law §100.l.e). 
Finally, we affirm the determination of the hearing 
officer that the specification of the charge relating to the scope 
of negotiations must be dismissed. The mere presentation of a 
proposal does not constitute an improper practice. We have held 
that parties may negotiate nonmandatory subjects and, indeed, that 
they should be encouraged to do so. A party making such a pro-
posal may even seek mediation of the dispute that it engenders, 
Board of Higher Education, 7 PERB 13028 (1974). While a party does 
violate its duty to negotiate in good faith if it improperly in-
sists upon a nonmandatory proposal, the Town's charge here does 
not so much as allege that PBA did so in the instant case. 
3 See County of Nassau, 12 PERB H3090 (1979) in which we commented 
favorably upon an opinion of counsel to this Board at 11 PERB 
ir5006 (1978) to the same effect. We found support in a decisior 
of the National Labor Relations Board, B'ar'tlet'f-Collins Co. , 
99 LRRM 1034 (1978). It held that procedures similar to those 
that the Town sought to impose are preliminary and subordinate 
to substantive negotiations and they should not be permitted to 
interfere with the commencement and progress of negotiations. 
3oard - U-3538/U-3569 
3ATED: Albany, New York 
November2$, 1979 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law of the hearing officer, 
and 
WE ORDER that the charge of the Town of 
Shelter Island be, and it hereby is, 
DISMISSED. 
arold R= Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus 
A-&M^— 
, Member 
)avxd C. Randies, Me 
t^i)»j4 
STATE OF NEW YORK _ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIO, BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOMPKINS-SENECA-TIOGA BOCES, 
Employer, 
- and -
TOMPKINS-SENECA-TIOGA BOCES EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner. 
Case No. C-1946 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
• A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment. Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority'vested in the Board.by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that TOMPKINS-SENECA-TIOGA BOCES 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION 
has been designated and selected by a majority of .the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances-. 
Unit: Included:- All regular non-certified personnel. 
Excluded: All positions in Attachment (1) 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with TOMPKINS-SENECA-
TIOGA BOCES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION • • 
and enter .into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 29th day of November , 19 79 
^ 
£055 
"U^3iC rtfLst.' 
Harold R." Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
ATTACHMENT 
(1)" 
Excluded: 
1. Treasurer of the Board of Education 
2. Clerk of the Board of Education 
3. Secretary to the Chief School Officer 
4. Secretary to the Assistant Chief School Officer 
5. Student employees 
6. Payroll Clerk 
7. Special project employees when the duration of the special project 
is for one year or less. This shall not be construed as. including 
CETA as a special project. 
8. Supervisors, Coordinators, and Directors as delineated below: 
a. Director of Occupational Education 
b. Director of Educational Communications 
c. Director of Special Education 
d. Director of Planning and Federal Aid 
e. Director of Business Affairs 
f. Coordinator of Placement and Follow-up Services 
g. Coordinator of Impact Project 
h. Coordinator of Bus Driver Training and Safety Education 
i. Coordinator of Area Adult Homemaking 
j. Coordinator of Gifted and Talented 
k. Coordinator of Guidance Services 
1. Coordinator of Youth Employment and Training Program 
m. Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIG. BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WASHINGTON COUNTY (SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT), 
Employer, 
- and -
WASHINGTON COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Case No. C-1952 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation 'proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in .the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair, Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION 
WASHINGTON COUNTY DEPUTY 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances-. 
Unit: Included: 
Excluded: 
Full-time deputy sheriffs and correction 
officers. 
Sheriff and under-sheriff. 
Further, IT IS. ORDERED that the above named public j 
employer shall negotiate'collectively with WASHINGTON COUNTY ! 
DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION ' j 
and enter into a written agreement with such employee organisation• 
; with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall |i negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the• ' 
•j determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 3 0 t h day of November , 19 79 
Albany, New York 
£fi 
WA^-S^A- / ^ > ^ < <^<. 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
. sM^a^ /Z^A**-^.—' 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATION BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES, SECOND SUPERVISORY DISTRICT 
MONROE-ORLEANS, 
-and-
Employer, Case No. C-1901 
TEACHER AIDES ASSOCIATION OF BOCES #2, 
NYSUT/ AFT, 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
•above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair. Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to.the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that 
of BOCES #2, NYSUT/AFT 
Teacher Aides Association 
has been designated and-selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above namea public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representa-
tive for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settle-
ment of grievances. 
Unit: Included: classroom Teacher Aides. 
Excluded: All other employees of the District. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public 
employer shall negotiate collectively with
 t h e Teacher Aides 
Association of BOCES,#2, NYSUT/AFT 
and enter, into a written agreement with such employee organization 
j with regard to terms and conditions cf employment, and shall 
I negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
! determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
i ' 
jl Signed on the 29th day of November , 19 79 . 
!
 at Albany, New York 
^ y y ? / ^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
n lv*" 1 rule M * -nv\ V-\ r\ i~ Ida Klaus- Member 
David C, KJUKVIOE: ib o r 
